This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. The realist

view of passage developed in this book differs from the robust, substan-
tivalist position. According to relationism, passage is nothing over and

above the succession of events, one thing coming after another. Causally
related events are temporally arranged as they happen one after another

along observers’ worldlines. There is no unique global passage but a mul-
tiplicity of local passages of time. After setting out this positive argument

for relationism, the author deals with five common objections to it: (a)
triviality of deflationary passage, (b) a-directionality of passage, (c) the
impossibility of experiencing passage, (d) fictionalism about passage, and
(e) the incompatibility of passage with perduring objects.

Relational Passage of Time will appeal to scholars and advanced stu-
dents working in philosophy of time, metaphysics, and philosophy of

physics.